Modeling ‘critical mass’ trade agreements

An ‘alter­nate’ approach to trade agreements

I’ve men­tioned in ear­lier posts that I’ve been look­ing at ‘crit­i­cal mass’ (CM) agree­ments among economies that could open world agri­cul­tural mar­kets, using the same approach as the 1998 Infor­ma­tion Tech­nol­ogy Agree­ment (ITA) that abol­ished all import bar­ri­ers on defined IT prod­ucts such as com­puter chips, disc dri­ves, cables, LCD screens and so forth. The ITA now cov­ers more than 90% of all trade in these prod­ucts ensur­ing that tar­iffs do not stand in the way of the rapid growth of IT technology.

CM agree­ments are not a typ­i­cal GATT/WTO approach to trade agree­ments but they have been used occa­sion­ally for many decades. For exam­ple, nego­ti­a­tions in the late 1970’s to con­trol export sub­si­dies and anti-dumping and to open up mar­kets for gov­ern­ment pro­cure­ment were based on CM agree­ments col­lec­tively known as the “Tokyo Round Codes”. In the early 1990s, the CM approach was used for the first ever trade agree­ment on trade in finan­cial ser­vices. Trade experts like the mem­bers of the War­wick Com­mis­sion on the future of WTO have long been attracted to the idea of ‘crit­i­cal mass’ agree­ments because they exploit the com­mer­cial logic that often defeats the the­o­retic case for trade liberalization.

The logic of CM agreements

The pre­miss of a CM agree­ment is that elim­i­nat­ing trade bar­ri­ers won’t hurt any pro­ducer active the mar­ket if every pro­ducer active in the mar­ket aban­dons pro­tec­tion. The ‘play­ing field’ will still be level and there’s a good chance that lower, unpro­tected, prices will see demand pick up. If a group of coun­tries account­ing for, say, 80% of world trade (imports + exports) agrees to elim­i­nate pro­tec­tion on a rec­i­p­ro­cal basis among them­selves, it really doesn’t mat­ter what the other 20% of small play­ers does.

In fact not includ­ing the small play­ers in the nego­ti­a­tion of the CM deal often means that it can be cleaner and quicker, with broader cov­er­age and fewer excep­tions and spe­cial con­di­tions that the smaller play­ers are likely to demand. The ITA agree­ment attracted it’s tar­get of 90% of world trade in IT prod­ucts within four months of the launch of the nego­ti­a­tions in Decem­ber 1996. That’s record speed for the nego­ti­a­tion of a WTO trade agreement.

Although coun­tries that don’t join a CM agree­ment don’t have any say in the final deal, it is not unfair to them. They get all the ben­e­fits (lower world mar­ket prices, open access to the mar­kets of the CM Agree­ment mem­bers) with­out hav­ing to make any changes to their own lev­els of pro­tec­tion. The ben­e­fits of a CM are non-discriminatory (MFN) but the costs are dis­crim­i­na­tory: borne only by the par­ties to the CM agreement.

Appli­ca­tion to agriculture

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Wouldn’t it be great if agri­cul­tural mar­kets could open up as quickly and as cleanly as the ITA opened up the infor­ma­tion tech­nol­ogy sec­tor? Agri­cul­ture is the sec­tor of world trade most affected by high dis­crim­i­na­tory trade bar­ri­ers and by pro­duc­tion and export sub­si­dies. These taxes and sub­si­dies make no sense in the world’s rich­est coun­tries (Europe, Japan, Korea, the United States) and lit­tle sense when they penal­ize the urban poor in devel­op­ing coun­tries. Bor­der bar­ri­ers to food trade—imports or exports—are almost always a bad idea.

Agri­cul­tural trade bar­ri­ers con­tributed to the rock­et­ing prices of grains, meat, dairy and oilseeds in 2007 that fed fears of a world ‘food cri­sis’. But, as the FAO points out, global food suf­fi­ciency is higher than ever. There is plenty of pro­duc­tion capac­ity and no rea­son for a ‘cri­sis’ except that bad poli­cies get in the way of effi­cient pro­duc­tion and dis­tri­b­u­tion. Open­ing up world mar­kets will reduce the impact of local food short­ages and cre­ate the incen­tives to ensure that sus­tain­able (in the eco­nomic and, prob­a­bly, eco­log­i­cal sense) pro­duc­tion grows to meet global food needs.

Gov­ern­ments know this, of course. The main rea­son gov­ern­ments don’t just chuck the bar­ri­ers is that remov­ing them typ­i­cally hurts some influ­en­tial groups a lot while help­ing many more by a lit­tle. Who gets hurt and who gets helped by a ‘crit­i­cal mass’ agree­ment in agri­cul­ture? That’s what I have been explor­ing with an eco­nomic model of world agri­cul­tural trade.

Some of the impacts of lib­er­al­iz­ing world agri­cul­tural trade are well known. For exam­ple, con­sumers in highly pro­tected economies such as Europe and Japan would pay a great deal less for food. Even in some devel­op­ing coun­tries where sta­ple foods like rice are highly pro­tected (Indone­sia), con­sumers would make big gains. At the same time, world prices would go up, help­ing pro­duc­ers from rich and poor coun­tries alike earn more and cre­at­ing the incen­tive to pro­duce more (and higher qual­ity) food.

Forth­com­ing posts on a model of global food trade

Glob­al­ized” food mar­kets are com­pli­cated things, how­ever. There are many ques­tions to answer. What would be the over­all impact on con­sumers and pro­duc­ers together in poor countries—that is, to the econ­omy as a whole? Would poor farm­ers be bet­ter off or worse off? In what coun­tries? Would the world econ­omy grow or shrink if domes­tic prices fell but traded prices rose?

In the next few posts, I’ll show you how I answered these ques­tions using the UNCTAD-FAO “Agri­cul­tural Trade Pol­icy Sim­u­la­tion Model” (ATPSM).

  • First, I’ll show you the impact of a ‘crit­i­cal mass’ agree­ment among coun­tries account­ing for 80 per­cent of world trade in cere­als to abol­ish tar­iffs and to abol­ish both tar­iffs and subsidies.
  • Next, I’ll show you the impact of an agree­ment to abol­ish tar­iffs on a broad group of prod­ucts includ­ing cere­als, meat, dairy, sugar and tem­per­ate oilseeds.
  • In a third post I’ll com­pare the pro­jected impact of this broad ‘crit­i­cal mass’ agree­ment with my esti­mate of the impacts of the pro­posed Doha Round agreement.
  • Finally, I’ll show you how I built the Doha Round model to illus­trate the tech­niques that you can use for your­self to model agri­cul­tural trade poli­cies using the ATPSM model.

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