Tag Archives: wto

Do border adjustment taxes work?

If the Gillard/Garnaut plan for a car­bon tax is imple­mented would border-adjustment taxes (BAT) help to off­set the trade impacts includ­ing loss of export com­pet­i­tive­ness and “carbon-leakage”? It turns out BATs might notl have any impact, good or bad, on trade. In the late 1960s, adis­agree­ment between Europe and the USA over the pro­tec­tion­ist impact

WTO treatment of a carbon tax

In which I try briefly to describe the prac­ti­cal impact of WTO rules on the admin­is­tra­tion of a com­pen­sated car­bon tax that is not levied on exports. The huge vol­umes of recent com­men­tary on the inter­ac­tion of WTO rules and car­bon emis­sion taxes or admin­is­tered mar­kets (“emis­sion trad­ing schemes”, ETS) con­tain a bewil­der­ing diver­sity of

Experts still optimists on Doha

Andrew Stoler, Direc­tor of the Insti­tute for Inter­na­tional Trade at Ade­laide Uni­ver­sity and for­mer Deputy Director-General of WTO has pub­lished the results of his most recent poll of expert opinion—including the anony­mous views of nego­tia­tors in Geneva—on the WTO Doha round (122 respon­dents). Here’s his sum­mary: While experts remain in large part scep­ti­cal about the

Trade ‘imbalances’ are misleading

Alexan­dro Jara, the Deputy Director-General of WTO “[R]elying on con­ven­tional trade sta­tis­tics gives a dis­torted pic­ture of trade imbal­ances between coun­tries. As we saw when look­ing at the Chi­nese con­tent of the iPad, what counts is not the imbal­ances as mea­sured by gross val­ues of exports and imports, but how much val­ued added is embed­ded in

ACTA is an attack on the WTO

India has com­plained in the recent TRIPS coun­cil that the ACTA pro­vi­sions mod­ify the bal­ance of rights and oblig­a­tions estab­lished by a mul­ti­lat­eral agree­ment (TRIPS) cov­er­ing the same domain. The secret nego­ti­a­tion of this pluri­lat­eral agree­ment by a cabal that included Aus­tralia is an attack on that bal­ance and hence on one of the pil­lars

Positions diverge on Doha negotiations

Another cold shower for WTO: last week’s attempt in Geneva to sketch out some ‘com­mon ground’ failed. National nego­ti­at­ing teams were said to be shocked (yes, ‘shocked’) by the size of the gaps between national posi­tions. “… nine years into the mul­ti­lat­eral trade talks, it remains unclear whether the invi­o­lable ‘red lines’ of promi­nent WTO

Schubert and the GATT

From a 1984 speech to the Con­fed­er­a­tion of British Indus­try by Hugh Cor­bet, then Direc­tor of the London-based Trade Pol­icy Research Centre.

The sit­u­a­tion* puts one in mind ofthe report pre­pared by a well-known firm of man­age­ment con­sul­tants com­mis­sioned to advise on the com­mer­cial dif­fi­cul­ties of a famous sym­phony orches­tra. Part of the report that was pre­pared dealt with a con­cert per­for­mance by the orches­tra of Schubert’s Unfin­ished Sym­phony. The com­ments of the con­sul­tants read as follows:

  1. For con­sid­er­able peri­ods, four oboe play­ers had noth­ing to do. The num­ber in this sec­tion should be reduced and their work spread over the whole of the orches­tra, thus elim­i­nat­ing peaks of inactivity.
  2. All twelve vio­lins were play­ing iden­ti­cal notes. This seems to be unnec­es­sary dupli­ca­tion and the staff in this sec­tion should be dras­ti­cally cut. If a large vol­ume of sound is really required, it could be obtained through an elec­tronic amplifier.
  3. Much effort was absorbed in the play­ing of demi-semi-quavers. This appears to be an exces­sive refine­ment and it is rec­om­mended that all notes should be rounded up to the near­est semi-quaver. If this were done it would be pos­si­ble to use trainees and low-grade operators.
  4. No use­ful pur­pose is served by repeat­ing with horns the pas­sage that has already been han­dled by strings. If all such redun­dant pas­sages were elim­i­nated, the con­cert could be reduced from two hours to twenty minutes.
  5. Finally, if Schu­bert had attended to all these mat­ters, he would prob­a­bly have been able to fin­ish his symphony.

Just as the con­sul­tants over­looked the pur­pose of the orches­tra, so trade nego­tia­tors appear to over­look the pur­pose of the GATT, which is to pro­vide a sta­ble insti­tu­tional envi­ron­ment for the con­duct of inter­na­tional trade, enabling pri­vate enter­prises to know where they stand vis-u-vis their gov­ern­ments, and the gov­ern­ments of other coun­tries, so that they can plan for expan­sion or if need be for adjust­ment — thereby facil­i­tat­ing the process of eco­nomic growth.

* 1984 was marked by ran­courous dis­putes and ‘blowups’ over prob­lems that were even­tu­ally addressed in the Uruguay Round: PWG

The sug­ges­tion that the nego­tia­tors (now WTO rather than GATT) have lost a sense of what the Orga­ni­za­tion is for, while build­ing the com­plex maze of man­age­ri­al­ist ‘fixes’ that is the pro­posed Doha deal, is still apt.